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Abstract
We study the equilibrium computation problem for two classical resource allocation
games: atomic splittable congestion games and multimarket Cournot oligopolies.
For atomic splittable congestion games with singleton strategies and player-specific
affine cost functions, we devise the first polynomial time algorithm computing a pure
Nash equilibrium. Our algorithm is combinatorial and computes the exact equilibrium
assuming rational input. The idea is to compute an equilibrium for an associated
integrally-splittable singleton congestion game in which the players can only split their
demands in integral multiples of a common packet size. While integral games have
been considered in the literature before, no polynomial time algorithm computing
an equilibrium was known. Also for this class, we devise the first polynomial time
algorithm and use it as a building block for our main algorithm.
We then develop a polynomial time computable transformation mapping a multi-
market Cournot competition game with firm-specific affine price functions and quadratic
costs to an associated atomic splittable congestion game as described above. The trans-
formation preserves equilibria in either games and, thus, leads – via our first algorithm
– to a polynomial time algorithm computing Cournot equilibria. Finally, our analysis
for integrally-splittable games implies new bounds on the difference between real and
integral Cournot equilibria. The bounds can be seen as a generalization of the recent
bounds for single market oligopolies obtained by Todd [43].
∗This work is part of the research programme Optimal Coordination Mechanisms for Distributed Resource
Allocation with project number 617.001.302, which is (partly) financed by the Netherlands Organisation
for Scientific Research (NWO).
An extended abstract of parts of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 19th International
IPCO Conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization under the title “Equilibrium
Computation in Atomic Splittable Singleton Congestion Games”.
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1 Introduction
One of the core topics in computational economics, operations research and optimization
is the computation of equilibria. As pointed out by several researchers (e.g. [10, 15]), the
computational tractability of a solution concept contributes to its credibility as a plausible
prediction of the outcome of competitive environments in practice. The most accepted
solution concept in non-cooperative game theory is the Nash equilibrium – a strategy profile,
from which no player wants to unilaterally deviate. While a Nash equilibrium generally
exists only in mixed strategies, the practically important class of congestion games admits
pure Nash equilibria, see Rosenthal [40]. In the classical model of Rosenthal, a pure strategy
of a player consists of a subset of resources, and the congestion cost of a resource depends
only on the number of players choosing the same resource.
While the complexity of computing equilibria for (discrete) congestion games has been
intensively studied over the last decade (cf. [2, 8, 9, 11, 18, 42]), the equilibrium computation
problem for the continuous variant, that is, for atomic splittable congestion games is much
less explored. In such a game, a player is associated with a positive demand and a collection
of allowable subsets of the resources. A strategy for a player is a (possibly fractional)
distribution of the player-specific demand over the allowable subsets. This quite basic
model has been extensively studied, starting in the 80’s in the context of traffic networks
(Haurie and Marcotte [25]) and later for modeling communication networks (cf. Orda et
al. [38] and Korilis et al. [27, 28]), and logistics networks (Cominetti et al. [12]). Regarding
polynomial time algorithms for equilibrium computation, we are only aware of two prior
works: (1) For affine player-independent cost functions, there exists a convex potential
whose global minima are pure Nash equilibria, see Cominetti et al. [12]. Thus, for any ǫ ą 0
one can compute an ǫ-approximate equilibrium in polynomial time by convex programming
methods. (2) Huang [26] also considered affine player-independent cost functions, and he
devised a combinatorial algorithm computing an exact equilibrium for routing games on
symmetric s-t graphs that are so-called well-designed. This condition is met for instance
by series-parallel graphs. His proof technique also uses the convex potential.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
Atomic Splittable Congestion Games. We study atomic splittable singleton conges-
tion games with player-specific affine cost functions and develop the first polynomial time
algorithm computing a pure Nash equilibrium. From now on we use equilibrium as shortcut
for pure Nash equilibrium. Our algorithm is purely combinatorial and computes an exact
equilibrium. The main ideas and constructions are as follows. By analyzing the first order
necessary optimality conditions of an equilibrium, it can be shown that any equilibrium is
rational as it is a solution to a system of linear equations with rational coefficients (assum-
ing rational input). Using that equilibria are unique for singleton games (see Richmann
and Shimkin [39] and Bhaskar et al. [5]), we further derive that the constraint matrix of the
equation system is non-singular, allowing for an explicit representation of the equilibrium
by Cramer’s rule (using determinants of the constraint- and their sub-matrices). This way,
we obtain an explicit lower bound on the minimum demand value for any used resource in
the equilibrium. We further show that the unique equilibrium is also the unique equilib-
rium for an associated integrally-splittable game in which the players may only distribute
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the demands in integer multiples of a common packet size of some value k˚ P Qą0 over
the resources. While we are not able to compute k˚ exactly, we can efficiently compute
some sufficiently small k0 ď k
˚ with the property that an equilibrium for the k0-integrally-
splittable game allows us to determine the set of resources on which a player will put a
positive amount of load in the atomic splittable equilibrium. Once these support sets are
known, an atomic splittable equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time by solving a
system of linear equations. This way, we can reduce the problem of computing the exact
equilibrium for an atomic splittable game to computing an equilibrium for an associated
k0-integrally-splittable game.
The class of integrally-splittable congestion games has been studied before by Tran-Thanh
et al. [46] for the case of player-independent convex cost functions and later by Harks et
al. [23, 24] (for the more general case of polymatroid strategy spaces and player-specific
convex cost functions). In particular, Harks et al. devised an algorithm with running time
n2mpδ{k0q
3, where n is the number of players, m the number of resources, and δ is an upper
bound on the maximum demand of the players (cf. Corollary 5.2 [24]). As δ is encoded
in binary, however, the algorithm is only pseudo-polynomial even for player-specific affine
cost functions.
We devise a polynomial time algorithm for integrally-splittable singleton congestion games
with player-specific affine cost functions. Our algorithm works as follows. For a game with
initial packet size k0, we start by finding an equilibrium for packet size k “ k0 ¨ 2
q for some
q of order Oplogpδ{k0qq, satisfying only a part of the player-specific demands. Then we
repeat the following two actions:
1. We half the packet size from k to k{2 and construct a k{2-equilibrium using the k-
equilibrium. Here, a k-equilibrium denotes an equilibrium for an integrally-splittable
game with common packet size k. We show that this can be done in polynomial time
by repeatedly performing the following operations given a k-equilibrium:
(a) Among players who can improve, we find the player that benefits most by moving
one packet of size k{2;
(b) If necessary, we perform a sequence of backward-shuffles of packets to correct
the load decrease caused by the first packet movement (this is called a backward
path);
(c) If necessary, we perform a sequence of forward-shuffles of packets to correct the
load increase caused by the first packet movement (this is called a forward path);
(a)-(c) is iterated until a k{2-equilibrium for the currently scheduled demand is
reached. For strategy profile x we define ∆pxq to be a vector that contains the
cost for moving one packet to the currently cheapest resource, for each combination
of a player and resource. We show that after each iteration ∆pxq lexicographically
increases, which implies that we converge to a k{2-equilibrium.
2. For each player i we repeat the following step: if the current packet size k is smaller
than the currently unscheduled demand of player i, we add one more packet for
this particular player to the game and recompute the equilibrium. This part of the
algorithm has also been used in the algorithm by Tran-Thanh et al. [46] and Harks
et al. [23].
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After q iterations, we have scheduled all demands and obtain an equilibrium for the desired
packet size k0. Polynomial running time of the algorithm is shown by several structural
results on the sensitivity of equilibria with respect to packet sizes 2k and k. Specifically, we
derive bounds on the difference of the resulting global load vectors as well as the individual
load vectors of players. We use these insights to show that ∆pxq reaches a lexicographical
maximum in a polynomial number of steps. Overall, compared to the existing algorithms of
Tran-Thanh et al. [46] and Harks et al. [23], our algorithm has two main innovations: packet
sizes are decreased exponentially (yielding polynomial running time in δ) and k-equilibrium
computation for an intermediate packet size k is achieved via a careful construction of a
sequence of single packet movements (backward- and forward paths) from a given 2k-
equilibrium (ensuring its polynomial length).
Multimarket Cournot Oligopolies. We then study the equilibrium computation prob-
lem for Cournot oligopolies. In the basic model of Cournot [14] introduced in 1838, firms
produce homogeneous goods and sell them in a common market. The selling price of the
goods depends on the total amount of goods that is offered in the market. Each firm aims
to maximize its profit, which is equal to the revenue minus the production costs. In a
multimarket oligopoly (cf. Bulow [7]), firms compete over a set of markets and each firm
has access to a firm-specific subset of the markets.
For multimarket oligopolies, we develop a poly-time computable isomorphism mapping a
multimarket Cournot competition game to an associated atomic splittable singleton con-
gestion game. The isomorphism is payoff invariant (up to constants) and thus preserves
equilibria in either games. As a consequence, we can apply the isomorphism and the
polynomial time algorithm for atomic splittable congestion games to efficiently compute
Cournot equilibria for models with firm-specific affine price functions and quadratic pro-
duction costs. In addition, our analysis for integrally-splittable games also implies new
bounds on the difference between real and integral Cournot equilibria complementing and
extending recent results of Todd [43].
1.2 Related Work
Discrete Congestion Games. As the first seminal work regarding the computational
complexity of equilibrium computation in congestions games, Fabrikant et al. [18] showed
that the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete for network con-
gestion games. Ackermann et al. [2] strengthened this result to hold even for network
congestion games with linear cost functions. On the other hand, there are polynomial al-
gorithms for symmetric network congestion games (cf. Fabrikant et al. [18]), for matroid
congestion games with player-specific cost functions (Ackermann et al. [2, 3]), for poly-
matroid congestion games with player-specific cost functions and polynomially bounded
demands (Harks et al. [23, 24]) and for so-called total unimodular congestion games (see
Del Pia et al. [16]). Further results regarding the computation of approximate equilibria
in congestion games can be found in Caragiannis et al. [8, 9], Chien and Sinclair [11] and
Skopalik and Vöcking [42].
Atomic Splittable Congestion Games. Atomic splittable network congestion games
with player-independent cost functions have been studied (seemingly independent) by Orda
et al. [38] and Haurie and Marcotte [25] and Marcotte [31]. Both lines of research men-
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tioned that Rosens’ existence result for concave games on compact strategy spaces implies
the existence of pure Nash equilibria via Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem. Cominetti et
al. [12] presented the first upper bounds on the price of anarchy in atomic splittable con-
gestion games. These were later improved by Harks [21] and finally shown to be tight by
Schoppmann and Roughgarden [41].
For the computation of equilibria, Marcotte [31] proposed four numerical algorithms and
showed local convergence results. Meunier and Pradeau [32] developed a pivoting-algorithm
(similar to Lemkes algorithm) for nonatomic network congestion games with affine player-
specific cost functions. Polynomial running time was, however, not shown and seems un-
likely to hold. Gairing et al. [19] considered nonatomic routing games on parallel links with
affine player-specific cost functions. They developed a convex potential function that can
be minimized within arbitrary precision in polynomial time. Deligkas et al. [17] considered
general concave games with compact action spaces and investigated algorithms comput-
ing an approximate equilibrium. Roughly speaking, they discretized the compact strategy
space and use the Lipschitz constants of utility functions to show that only a finite num-
ber of representative strategy profiles need to be considered for obtaining an approximate
equilibrium (see also Lipton et al. [30] for a similar approach). The running time of the
algorithm, however, depends on an upper bound of the norm of strategy vectors, thus,
implying only a pseudo-polynomial algorithm for our setting.
Linear Complementarity Problems. The equilibrium computation problem in atomic
splittable congestion games with singleton strategies and affine cost functions can be written
as a linear complementary problem (LPC), see Appendix A for the formal derivation. Given
a matrix M and a vector q, a linear complementarity problem LCP pM, qq seeks a vector z
such that the following three properties hold: (1) z ě 0 (2)Mz`q ě 0 and (3) zT pMz`qq “
0. If matrix M is positive definite, the solution to the LCP pM, qq can be found within
polynomial time for any q. When we write an atomic splittable congestion game as an
LCP pM, qq (see Appendix A), then M is not positive definite.
Matrix M is a P -matrix, i.e., a matrix where every principal minor is positive, if and only
if the solution to the LCP pM, qq is unique for every q [13, 35]. In some specific cases, this
solution can be found within polynomial time [49]. Though an atomic splittable congestion
game on singleton strategies has a unique solution, M is not a P -matrix the corresponding
LCP pM, qq. When the demands, that only occur in q, are set to zero, multiple solutions to
the LCP pM, qq exist. Ye and Pardalos [50] studied classes of LPC’s for which a polynomial
time algorithm are known; e.g. whenM is co-positive and q ě 0, or whenM´1 is co-positive
and M´1q ď 0, but the corresponding LCP of our problem does not seem to belong to any
of these classes.
Multimarket Cournot Oligopolies. The existence of equilibria in single market Cournot
models (beyond quasi-polynomial utility functions) has been studied extensively in the past
decades (see Vives [48] for a good survey). E.g., Novshek [37] proved that equilibria exists
whenever the marginal revenue of each firm is decreasing in the aggregate quantities of the
other firms. Then, several works (cf. Topkis [44], Amir [4], Kukushkin [29], Milgrom and
Roberts [33], Milgrom and Shannon [34], Topkis [45] and Vives [47]) proved existence of
equilibria when the underlying game is supermodular, i.e., when the strategy space forms
a lattice and the marginal utility of each firm is increasing in any other firm’s output.
Using supermodularity, one can obtain existence results without assuming that the utility
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functions are quasi-convex. Very recently, Todd [43] considered Cournot competition on a
single market, where the price functions are linear and cost functions are quadratic. For
such games, he proved that equilibria exist and can be computed in time Opn logpnqq,
where n denotes the number of firms. Additionally, he analyzed the maximum differences
of production quantities of real an integral equilibria, respectively.
Abolhassani et al. [1] devised several polynomial time algorithms (partly using algorithms
for solving nonlinear complementarity problems) for multimarket Cournot oligopolies. In
contrast to our work, they assume that price functions are firm-independent. Bimpikis et
al. [6] provided a characterization of the production quantities at the unique equilibrium,
when price functions are player-independent and concave, and cost functions are convex.
They study the impact of changes in the competition structure on the firm’s profit. This
framework can be used to either identify opportunities for collaboration and expanding in
new markets. Harks and Klimm [22] studied the existence of Cournot equilibria, under
the condition that each firm can only sell its items to a limited number of markets simul-
taneously. They proved that equilibria exist when production cost functions are convex,
marginal return functions strictly decrease for strictly increased own quantities and non-
decreased aggregated quantities and when for every firm, the firm specific market reaction
functions across markets are identical up to market-specific shifts.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Atomic Splittable Singleton Games
An atomic splittable singleton congestion game is represented by the tuple:
G :“ pN,E, pdiqiPN , pEiqiPN , pci,eqiPN,ePEiq ,
where E “ te1, . . . , emu is a finite set of resources and N “ t1, . . . , nu is a finite set of
players. Each player i P N is associated with a demand di P Qě0 and a set of allowable
resources Ei Ď E. A strategy for player i P N is a (possibly fractional) distribution of the
demand di over the singletons in Ei. Thus, one can represent the strategy space of every
player i P N by the polytope:
Sipdiq :“
!
xi P R
|Ei|
ě0 |
ÿ
ePEi
xi,e “ di
)
.
The combined strategy space is denoted by S :“
Ś
iPN Sipdiq and we denote by x “ pxiqiPN
the overall strategy profile. We define xi,e :“ pxiqe as the load of player i on e P Ei and
xi,e “ 0 when e P EzEi. The total load on e is given as xe :“
ř
iPN xi,e. Resources have
player-specific affine cost functions ci,epxeq “ ai,exe` bi,e with ai,e P Qą0 and bi,e P Qě0 for
all i P N and e P E. The total cost of player i in strategy distribution x is defined as:
πipxq “
ÿ
ePEi
ci,epxeqxi,e.
For i P N , we write S´ipd´iq “
Ś
j‰i Sjpdjq and x “ pxi, x´iq meaning that xi P Sipdiq and
x´i P S´ipd´iq. A strategy profile x is an equilibrium if πipxq ď πipyi, x´iq for all i P N
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and yi P Sipdiq. A pair
`
x, pyi, x´iq
˘
P S ˆ S is called an improving move of player i, if
πipxi, x´iq ą πipyi, x´iq. The marginal cost for player i on resource e is defined as:
µi,epxq “ ci,epxeq ` xi,ec
1
i,epxeq “ ai,epxe ` xi,eq ` bi,e.
We obtain the following sufficient and necessary equilibrium condition.
Lemma 2.1 (cf. Harks [21]). Strategy profile x is an equilibrium if and only if the following
holds for all i P N : when xi,e ą 0, then µi,epxq ď µi,fpxq for all f P Ei.
Using that the strategy space is compact and cost functions are convex, Kakutanis’ fixed
point theorem implies the existence of an equilibrium. Uniqueness is proven by Richmann
and Shimkin [39] and Bhaskar et al. [5].
Game G is called symmetric whenever Ei “ E for all i P N . We can project any asymmetric
game G on a symmetric game G˚ by setting:
c˚i,epxeq “
#
ci,epxeq if e P Ei,
xe ` pn` 2qpamaxq
2 otherwise,
for all i P N and e P EzEi, where:
amax :“ maxtai,e, bi,e | i P N, e P Eiu, tdi | i P Nu, 1u.
In this case µi,ep0q ě µi,f pxeq for any e P EzEi, f P Ei, i P N and x P S. Thus, in an
equilibrium y for game G˚ no player i puts load on any resource e P EzEi. Hence, y is also
an equilibrium for game G. In the rest of this paper we project every asymmetric game on
a symmetric game using the construction above.
2.2 Integral Singleton Games
A k-integral game is given by the tuple Gk :“ pN,E, pdiqiPN , pci,eqiPN,ePEq with k P Qą0.
Here, players cannot split their load fractionally, but only in multiples of k. Assume di is
a multiple of k, then the strategy space for player i is the following set:
Sipdi, kq :“
!
xi P Q
|E|
ě0 | xi,e “ kq, q P Ně0,
ÿ
ePE
xi,e “ di
)
.
In this game, k is also called the packet size. When E,N and pci,eqiPN,ePE are clear from
the context, we will also refer to the game as GkppdiqiPN q. For player-specific affine cost
functions the (discrete) marginal increase and decrease are defined as follows:
µ`ki,e pxq “ pxi,e ` kqci,epxe ` kq ´ xi,eci,epxeq, (1)
µ´ki,e pxq “
#
xi,eci,epxeq ´ pxi,e ´ kqci,epxe ´ kq, if xi,e ą 0
´8, if xi,e ď 0.
(2)
Here, µ`ki,e pxq is the cost for player i to add one packet of size k to resource e and µ
´k
i,e pxq
is the gain for player i of removing a packet from resource e. Assuming that cost functions
are affine, we obtain µ`ki,e pxq “ kai,epxe ` xi,e ` kq and µ
´k
i,e pxq “ kai,epxe ` xi,e ´ kq.
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Lemma 2.2 (cf. Groenevelt [20]). Strategy profile x is an equilibrium in a k-integral
congestion game if and only if for all i P N : when xi,e ą 0, then µ
´k
i,e pxq ď µ
`k
i,f pxq for all
f P E.
Define µ`ki,minpxq :“ minePEtµ
`k
i,e pxqu and µ
´k
i,maxpxq :“ maxePEtµ
´k
i,e pxqu. Then strategy
profile x is an equilibrium in a k-integral congestion game if and only if µ´ki,maxpxq ď µ
`k
i,minpxq
for all i P N .
3 Reduction to Integrally-Splittable Games
We show that the problem of finding an equilibrium for an atomic splittable game reduces
to the problem of finding an equilibrium for a k0-integral game for some k0 P Qą0.
Theorem 3.1. Let x be the unique equilibrium of an atomic splittable singleton game G.
Then, there exists a k˚ P Qą0 such that x is also the unique equilibrium for the k
˚-integral
splittable game Gk˚.
Proof. We define the support set for each player as Ii :“ te P E | xi,e ą 0u. Lemma 2.1
implies that if x is an equilibrium, and xi,e, xi,f ą 0, then µi,epxq “ µi,fpxq. Define
p :“
ř
iPN |Ii| ď nm. Then, if the correct support set Ii of each player is known, the
equilibrium can be computed by solving the following set of p linear equations on p variables.
1. For every player we have an equation that makes sure the demand of that player is
satisfied. Thus, for each player i P N we have
ř
ePIi
xi,e “ di.
2. For every player i P N , there are |Ii| ´ 1 equations of type µi,epxq “ µi,f pxq for
e, f P Ii, which we write as ai,epxe ` xi,eq ´ ai,f pxf ` xi,f q “ bi,e ´ bi,f . Note that xe
is not an extra variable, but an abbreviation for
ř
iPN xi,e.
From now on we refer to this set of equalities as the system Ax “ b, where A is a p ˆ p
matrix. Note that as the equilibrium exists and is unique, the corresponding matrix is
non-singular. Using Cramer’s Rule, the unique solution is given by:
xi,e “ detpAi,eq{detpAq “ |detpAi,eq|{|detpAq|,
where Ai,e is the matrix formed by replacing the column that corresponds to value xi,e in
A by b. We first define the set of input values as Q :“ ttai,e, bi,e | i P N, e P Eiu, tdi | i P
Nu, 1u. We define the greatest common divisor of Q as:
agcd :“ maxta P Qą0 | @q P Q, Dℓ P N such that q “ a ¨ ℓu.
Then, as all values in A and b depend on adding and subtracting values in Q, |detpAi,eq|
is an integer multiple of pagcdq
p and, hence, an integer multiple of pagcdq
nm. Thus, all
player-specific loads are integer multiples of pagcdq
nm{|detpAq| and, hence, if we define
k˚ “ pagcdq
nm{|detpAq|, x is an equilibrium for the k˚-integral splittable game. Note that
we can compute agcd in running time Opnm log amaxq.
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It is left to prove that x is the unique equilibrium for the k˚-integral splittable game. As-
sume on the contrary that there are two different equilibria x, y, where x is the equilibrium
for the atomic splittable game. We define:
E` :“ te P E|xe ą yeu, N
` :“ ti P N |
ÿ
ePE`
pxi,e ´ yi,eq ą 0u,
E´ :“ te P E|xe ď yeu, N
´ :“ ti P N |
ÿ
ePE´
pxi,e ´ yi,eq ă 0u.
Clearly N` ‰ H, and as each player distributes the same amount of load in x and y we
have N` “ N´. Choose a player i P N` “ N´, then there exist resources e and f such
that xe ą ye, xi,e ą yi,e, xf ď yf and xi,f ă yi,f . Then, we have:
µ`k
˚
i,e pyq ă µ
`k˚
i,e pxq ´ pk
˚q2ai,e pas xe ě ye ` k
˚ and xi,e ě yi,e ` k
˚q
“ k˚ ¨ µi,epxq pby rewritingq
ď k˚ ¨ µi,fpxq pas x is the atomic splittable equilibrium)
“ µ´k
˚
i,f pxq ` pk
˚q2ai,f pby rewritingq
ď µ´k
˚
i,f pyq. pas xf ď yf and xi,f ď yi,f ` k
˚q
This contradicts the fact that y is an equilibrium. Thus, x is the unique k˚-integral split-
table equilibrium.
Note that we do not know matrix A beforehand, but we do know that 2amax is an upper
bound on the values occurring in A. Using Hadamard’s inequality we find that |detpAq| ď
p2amaxq
nmpnmqnm{2. Hence, we can find a lower bound of k˚:
k˚ ě
anmgcd
p2amaxqnmpnmqnm{2
.
The idea is that for the atomic splittable equilibrium x and any k-integral-splittable equi-
librium xk, there exist bounds on |xe ´ pxkqe| and |xi,e ´ pxkqi,e| in terms of k and m.
Then, given the equilibrium for some sufficiently small k0, we are able compute the correct
support set of each player and compute the exact equilibrium by solving system Ax “ b as
described earlier.
Let x be a Nash equilibrium for an atomic splittable game and xk an equilibrium for a k-
integral splittable game. We show that |pxkqe´xe| ă mk (Lemma 3.2) and |pxkqi,e´xi,e| ă
m2k (Lemma 3.3).
Lemma 3.2. Let x be an equilibrium for an atomic splittable game, and xk be an equilibrium
for a k-integral splittable game. Then |pxkqe ´ xe| ă mk for all e P E.
Proof. We prove this lemma by contradiction and assume |pxkqe´xe| ě mk for some e P E.
Then, there are two cases: either pxkqe ´ xe ě mk or pxkqe ´ xe ď ´mk. We discuss why
pxkqe ´ xe ě mk leads to a contradiction. The second case is similar, but with reversed
inequalities.
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Thus we assume pxkqe´xe ě mk. We introduce two player sets N
`
f , N
´
f for every resource
f P E, where N`f “ ti P N |pxkqi,f ą xi,fu and N
´
f “ ti P N |pxkqi,f ă xi,fu. First note
that for every i P N`e we have pxkqe ` pxkqi,e ą xe ` xi,e `mk. Hence,
pxkqe ` pxkqi,e ą xe ` xi,e ` k and pxkqi,e ą xi,e ě 0. (3)
Then, using the player sets, we obtain:ÿ
iPN`e
ppxkqi,e ´ xi,eq `
ÿ
iPN´e
ppxkqi,e ´ xi,eq “ pxkqe ´ xe.
As
ř
iPN´e
ppxkqi,e ´ xi,eq ď 0 and pxkqe ´ xe ě mk, we obtain:ÿ
iPN`e
ppxkqi,e ´ xi,eq ě mk.
The total load distributed by player i does not change, therefore:ÿ
f‰e
ÿ
iPN`e
pxkqi,f ´ xi,f ď ´mk.
For every resource f ‰ e we then obtain:ÿ
f‰e
ÿ
iPN`e XN
´
f
ppxkqi,f ´ xi,f q `
ÿ
iPN`e XN
`
f
ppxkqi,f ´ xi,fq ď ´mk,
as N “ N´f YN
“
f YN
´
` , and for all i P N
“
f it holds that pxkqi,f ´ xi,f “ 0. By definition
of N`f , it holds that
ř
f‰e
ř
iPN`e XN
`
f
ppxkqi,f ´ xi,f q ě 0. And thus:
ÿ
f‰e
ÿ
iPN`e XN
´
f
ppxkqi,f ´ xi,f q ď ´mk. (4)
As pxkqe ´ xe ě mk and the total load in the system is the same in x and xk, we haveř
f‰eppxkqf ´ xf q ď ´mk. Thereforeÿ
f‰e
ÿ
iPN`e XN
´
f
ppxkqf ´ xf q ď ´|N
`
e XN
´
f |mk.
We add this to equation (4) to obtainÿ
f‰e
ÿ
iPN`e XN
´
f
ppxkqf ´ xf q ` ppxkqi,f ´ xi,f q ď ´p|N
`
e XN
´
f | ` 1qmk.
By using the pigeonhole principle on the number of resources f ‰ e, f P E, there must
exists an f P E, f ‰ e such thatÿ
iPN`e XN
´
f
ppxkqf ´ xf q ` ppxkqi,f ´ xi,f q ă ´p|N
`
e XN
´
f | ` 1qk.
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Using the pigeonhole principle again on the number of players in N`e X N
´
f , there must
exist an i P N`e XN
´
f such that:
pxkqf ` pxkqi,f ď xf ` xi,f ´ k. (5)
Then:
µi,f pxq ě1
1
k
µ`ki,f pxkq ě2
1
k
µ´ki,e pxkq ą3 µi,epxq (6)
Here ě1 is due to inequality (5), ě2 is due to the fact that xk is a Nash equilibrium
and ą3 is due to inequality (3). Inequality (6) now contradicts the fact that x is a Nash
equilibrium.
Thus, we established a bound on the difference in total load for an atomic splittable equi-
librium and a k-integral splittable equilibrium. We use this bound on the total load to
establish bounds on the difference in player-specific load on a resource.
Lemma 3.3. Let x be an equilibrium for an atomic splittable game, and xk be an equilibrium
for the corresponding k-integral splittable game. Then |pxkqi,e ´ xi,e| ă m
2k for all i P N
and e P E.
Proof. We prove this lemma by contradiction. Assume |pxkqi,e ´ xi,e| ě m
2k, again there
are two cases: pxkqi,e ě xi,e `m
2k or pxkqi,e ď xi,e ´m
2k. We first discuss why pxkqi,e ě
xi,e `m
2k leads to a contradiction. The same reasoning holds for pxkqi,e ď xi,e ´m
2k, by
reversing all inequalities.
Thus, we assume that pxkqi,e ě xi,e`m
2k. From Lemma 3.2 we know that pxkqe ě xe´mk.
Adding both inequalities we obtain
pxkqe ` pxkqi,e ě xe ` xi,e `mpm´ 1qk. (7)
As the total load distributed by player i does not change, and neither does the total load
in the system change, we obtain:ÿ
f‰e
ppxkqf ` pxkqi,f q ě
ÿ
f‰e
pxf ` xi,f q ´mpm´ 1qk.
As there are m ´ 1 remaining resources besides resource e, there must exist at least one
resource f P E such that:
pxkqf ` pxkqi,f ě xf ` xi,f ´mk. (8)
Note that xi,f ą 0, as xi,f “ 0 implies pxkqf ă xf ´mk which contradicts Lemma 3.2. We
obtain:
µi,fpxq ě1
1
k
µ`ki,f pxkq ě2
1
k
µ´ki,e pxkq ą3 µi,epxq. (9)
Assuming m ě 2, ě1 follows from inequality (8), ě2 is due to the fact that xk is a Nash
equilibrium and ą3 follows from inequality (7). Inequality (9), combined with xi,f ą 0,
contradicts the fact that x is a Nash equilibrium. Altogether we get |pxkqi,e ´ xi,e| ă m
2k
for all i P N and e P E.
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Thus, if we compute an equilibrium for a sufficiently small k0, this k0-integral-splittable
equilibrium should be fairly similar to the unique k˚-integral splittable equilibrium. Hence,
it enables us to find the correct support sets and compute the exact atomic splittable
equilibrium.
Theorem 3.4. Given an atomic splittable congestion game G and an equilibrium xk0 for
k0-splittable game Gk0 , where:
k0 :“
1
2m2
¨
anmgcd
rp2amaxqnmpnmqnm{2s
,
we can compute in Oppnmq3q the exact atomic splittable equilibrium x for game G.
Proof. First note that all demands di are integer multiples of k0, as di is an integer multiple
of agcd, and both 2m
2 and rp2amaxq
nmpnmqnm{2s are integer.
Theorem 3.1 implies that there exists a k˚ such that the atomic splittable equilibrium is
also an equilibrium for the k˚-integral splittable game. In the following we show that there
is a load-threshold m2k0 that enables us to decide whether or not a resource receives any
demand from player i in the equilibrium of the atomic splittable game.
1. If pxk0qi,e ă m
2k0, then xi,e “ 0. Assume by contradiction that xi,e ą 0. Remember
that the atomic splittable equilibrium is also an k˚-equilibrium and thus, if xi,e ą 0,
then the inequality xi,e ě k
˚ must hold. We obtain:
xi,e ´ pxk0qi,e ą k
˚ ´m2k0 ě
1
2
¨
anmgcd
rp2amaxqnmpnmqnm{2s
“ m2k0,
which contradicts Lemma 3.3. Thus, xi,e “ 0.
2. If pxk0qi,e ě m
2k0, then we prove that xi,e ą 0. On the contrary, we assume that
xi,e “ 0. In this case we have pxk0qi,e ´ xi,e ě m
2k0, which contradicts Lemma 3.3.
Thus, xi,e ą 0.
Hence, given an equilibrium pxk0q for k0-splittable game Gk0 , we can compute the correct
support sets Ii for all i P N , where Ii :“ te P E | pxk0qi,e ě m
2k0u. Given the correct
support sets, we can easily compute the correct, exact equilibrium by solving the system
Ax “ b of at most nm linear equations in running time Oppnmq3q using Gaussian elimina-
tion [36].
It is left to compute an equilibrium xk0 for integral game Gk0 . Such integral games have been
studied in the literature before, see Harks et al. [23, 24]. In particular, [24, Algorithm 1]
has running time Opnmpδ{k0q
3q. Here δ is an upper bound on the player-specific demands.
In general, δ is not bounded in k0, thus, the running time is not polynomially bounded in
the size of the input.
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4 A Polynomial Algorithm for Integral Games
The goal of this section is to develop a polynomial time algorithm that computes an equilib-
rium for any k-integral splittable singleton game with player-specific affine cost functions.
We use elements of [46, Algorithm 1] and [23, Algorithm 1] to construct a new algorithm
with running time Opn2m14 logpδ{kqq. We first introduce some new notation. For two vec-
tors xi, yi P R
|E|, we denote their Hamming distance by Hpxi, yiq :“
ř
ePE |xi,e ´ yi,e|.
For two strategy profiles x and y, we denote their Hamming distance by Hpx, yq :“ř
ePE |xe´ ye|. For two resources e
´, e` P E, we denote yi “ pxiqe´Ñe` if yi,e´ “ xi,e´ ´ k,
yi,e` “ xi,e` ` k and yi,e “ xi,e for all e P Ezte
´, e`u. If x is a strategy profile for some
game Gk and yi “ pxiqe´Ñe`, we denote pyi, x´iq “ xi:e´Ñe` . We define a restricted best
response:
Definition 4.1. Let x be a strategy profile for game GkppdiqiPN q. Assume there exists
e´, e` P E such that e´ P argmaxtµ´ki,e pxqu, e
` P argmintµ`ki,e pxqu and µ
´k
i,e´
pxq ą µ`k
i,e`
pxq.
Then, we term strategy yi “ pxiqe´Ñe` a restricted best response to x for player i.
Note that when yi is a restricted best response to xi, Hpxi, yiq “ 2k. We first describe two
subroutines, termed Add and Restore.
4.1 Add
The first subroutine, Add, is described in Algorithm 1 and consists of lines 4-10 of [23,
Algorithm 1]. Given an equilibrium xk for game GkppdiqiPN q, it computes an equilibrium
for the game, where the demand for player j is increased by k. First it decides on the best
resource f for player j to put her new packet. In effect, the load on resource f increases
and only those players with xi,f ą 0 can potentially decrease their cost by a deviation. In
this case, Harks et al. proved in [23, Theorem 3.2] that a best response can be obtained by
a restricted best response moving a packet away from f . Thus, only one packet is moved
throughout, preserving the invariant that only players using a resource to which the packet
is moved may have an incentive to profitably deviate.
Algorithm 1: Subroutine Addpx, i,Gkppd
1
iqiPN qq
Input: equilibrium xk for Gkppd
1
iqiPN q, player i
Output: equilibrium x1k for Gkppd
1
iqiPN q, where d
1
j Ð d
1
j ` k;
1 xÐ xk; d
1
j Ð d
1
j ` k;S
1
j Ð Sjpd
1
j , kq;
2 Choose f P argmintµ`kj,e pxqu;
3 xj,f Ð xj,f ` k;
4 while Di P N who can improve in Gk do
5 Compute a restricted best response yi P S
1
i;
6 xi Ð yi;
7 end
8 x1k Ð x;
9 return x1k
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4.2 Restore
The second subroutine, Restore, takes as input an equilibrium x2k for packet size 2k and
game GkppdiqiPN q, and constructs an equilibrium for packet size k. This algorithm makes
use of two sub-algorithms: Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 5. In Algorithm 2 we create a
backward path of restricted best responses. In a backward path we are given a resource e´1
and a strategy profile xb1. In iteration q, we decide if there exists a player i that has a
restricted best response from some e´q`1 to e
´
q , and if so, we define x
b
q`1 Ð px
b
qqi:e´q`1Ñe
´
q
. If
no player has a restricted best response to resource e´q , we check if px
b
qqe´q ą px2kqe´q ´2mk.
If so, we end our backward path. Else, we look for a player that has an improving move in
which she shifts one packet from some e´q`1 to e
´
q , and then continue the backward path.
Note that in each step we preserve the invariant that Hpxb1, x
b
qq P t0, 2ku.
Algorithm 2: BPpx2k, x
b
1, e
´
1 ,Gkq : A backward path of restricted best responses.
Input: equilibrium x2k for game G2k, strategy profile x
b
1 for game Gk, a resource e
´
1
and game Gk.
Output: Strategy profile xbqb for game Gk and resource e
´
q .
1 Initialize q Ð 1;
2 repeat
3 if pxbqqe´q ď px2kqe´q ´ 2mk then
4 Find player i and resource e´q`1 satisfying properties:
5 B1. pxbqqi,e´q ă px2kqi,e´q ;
6 B2. e´q`1 P argmaxtµ
´k
i,e px
b
qqu ;
7 B3. µ`k
i,e´q
pxbqq ă µ
´k
i,e´q`1
pxbqq;
8 Define xbq`1 Ð px
b
qqi:e´q`1Ñe
´
q
;
9 q Ð q ` 1;
10 end
11 while Di P N with e´q “ argminePEtµ
`k
i,e px
b
qqu and µ
`k
i,minpx
b
qq ă µ
´k
i,maxpx
b
qq do
12 Choose e´q`1 P argmaxtµ
´k
i,e px
b
qqu;
13 xbq`1 Ð px
b
qqi:e´q`1Ñe
´
q
;
14 q Ð q ` 1;
15 end
16 until pxbqqe´q ą px2kqe´q ´ 2mk;
17 return pxbq, e
´
q q
In Algorithm 5 we create a forward path of restricted best responses. A forward path is very
similar to a backward path, but we change the perspective. Thus, given a resource e`q and
a strategy profile xfq , we check in iteration q if there exists a player that has a restricted
best response from e`q to some e
`
q`1. As this algorithm is very similar to Algorithm 2, it is
moved to Appendix B. Both algorithms (back- and forward path) can be seen as a special
instantiation of a general restricted best response dynamic (cf. [23, 46]).
We are now ready to define subroutine Restore. Initialize x by equilibrium x2k. While
x is not an equilibrium for Gk, we iterate the following. Among players who can improve,
14
we find the player j that benefits most from a restricted best response. We carry out a
restricted best response for player j and move a packet from some resource e´1 to some
e`1 . Then we compute a backward path, starting in resource e
´
1 . If the resulting strategy
profile has Hamming distance zero with x, we stop this iteration and overwrite x by the
resulting strategy profile. Else, we compute a forward path, starting in e`1 and overwrite
x by the resulting strategy profile. The pseudo-code of subroutine Restore can be found
in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: Subroutine Restorepx, k, pd1iqiPN ,Gq
Input: equilibrium x2k for G2kppd
1
iqiPN q
Output: equilibrium xk for Gkppd
1
iqiPN q
1 xÐ x2k;
2 while x not an equilibrium for Gkppd
1
iqiPN q do
3 j Ð argmaxiPNtµ
`k
i,minpxq ´ µ
´k
i,maxpxqu;
4 Choose e´1 P argmaxtµ
´k
j,e pxqu and e
`
1 P argmintµ
`k
j,e pxqu;
5 xb1 Ð xj:e´
1
Ñe`
1
;
6 pxbqb , e
´
qb
q Ð BPpxk, x
b
1, e
´
1 ,Gkq;
7 if e`1 ‰ e
´
qb
then
8 x
f
1 Ð x
b
qb
;
9 pxfqf , e
`
qf
q Ð FPpxk, x
f
1 , e
`
1 ,Gkq;
10 x1 Ð xfqf ;
11 else
12 x1 Ð xbqb ;
13 end
14 xÐ x1;
15 end
16 xk Ð x;
17 return xk;
4.3 PacketHalver
Using the subroutines Add and Restore we develop PacketHalver, which computes
an equilibrium xk0 for the k0-splittable game Gk0ppdiqiPN qq. In this algorithm we start
with an equilibrium xk for Gkppd
1
iqiPN qq, where d
1
i “ 0 for all i P N , k “ 2
q1k0 and
q1 “ argminqPNt2
qk0 ą maxiPN diu. Note that this game has a trivial equilibrium, where
pxkqi,e “ 0 for all i P N and e P E. We repeat the following two steps:
• Given an equilibrium xk for Gkppd
1
iqiPN q, we construct an equilibrium for Gk{2ppd
1
iqiPN q
using subroutine Restore and set k to k{2.
• For each player i P N we check if di´d
1
i ě k. If so, we increase d
1
i by k and recompute
equilibrium xk using subroutine Add.
After q1 iterations PacketHalver returns an equilibrium xk0 for Gk0ppdiqiPN qq. The
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pseudo-code of PacketHalver can be found in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: Algorithm PacketHalverpGk0ppdiqiPN qq
Input: Integral splittable congestion game Gk0 “ pN,E, pdiqiPN , pci,eqiPN,ePEq.
Output: An equilibrium xk0 for Gk0 .
1 Initialize q1 “ argminqPNt2
qk0 ą maxiPN diu; k Ð 2
q1k0; d
1
i Ð 0; xk Ð p0qePE,iPN ;
2 for 1, . . . , q1 ´ 1 do
3 k Ð k{2;
4 xk Ð Restorepx2k,Gkppd
1
iqiPN qqq;
5 for i P N do
6 if di ´ d
1
i ą k then
7 xk Ð Addpxk, i,Gkppd
1
iqiPN qqq;
8 d1i Ð d
1
i ` k;
9 end
10 end
11 end
12 return xk;
5 Correctness
In this section, we prove that PacketHalver indeed returns an equilibrium for game
Gk0ppdiqiPN q. In order to do so, we first need to verify that the two subroutines Add
and Restore are correct. Subroutine Add is proven to be correct by Harks, Peis, and
Klimm [23], thus, it is left to verify correctness of Restore and PacketHalver.
5.1 Correctness Restore
To verify the correctness of subroutine Restorepx2k,GkppdiqiPN qqq, we need to prove that
Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 5 are well-defined, and that Restore terminates.
To prove that Algorithm 2 is well-defined, we need to verify that if pxbqqe´q ď px2kqe´q ´2mk,
there exists a player i and a resource e´q`1 satisfying Property B1, B2 and B3.
Lemma 5.1. In Algorithm 2, if pxbqqe´q ď px2kqe´q ´ 2mk, then we can find a player i and
a resource e´q`1 satisfying Property B1, B2 and B3.
Proof. The idea for this proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 3.2. When pxbqqe´q ď
px2kqe´q ´ 2mk, we can find a player that can decrease its cost by moving a packet from
some e´q`1 to e
´
q . The maximum cost decrease is attained by choosing e
´
q`1 P maxePEtµ
´k
i,e u.
The full proof can be found in Appendix C.
Algorithm 5 is well-defined if we can find a player i and a resource e`q`1 satisfying Property
F1, F2 and F3 whenever pxfq qe`q ě px2kqe`q ` 2mk.
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Lemma 5.2. In Algorithm 5, if pxfq qe`q ě px2kqe`q ` 2mk, then we can find a player i and
a resource e`q`1 satisfying Property F1, F2 and F3.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is omitted as it is similar to the proof of Lemma 5.1, where
all inequalities are reversed.
It is left to prove that Restore terminates. We define:
∆pxq :“ pµ`ki,minpxq ´ µ
´k
i,e pxqqiPN ;ePE and ∆ipxq :“ pµ
`k
i,minpxq ´ µ
´k
i,e pxqqePE .
Let ∆minpxq be the minimum value in ∆pxq. Note that when all elements in ∆pxq are non-
negative, or, equivalently, when ∆minpxq is non-negative, x is an equilibrium. Our goal is
to show that after each iteration in the while-loop (lines 2 - 15 of Restore) ∆pxq increases
according to a certain lexicographical order defined as follows. Given two vectors u, v P Rn,
we say that v is sorted lexicographically larger than u, if there is an index k P t1, . . . , nu
such that uφpiq “ vψpiq for all i ă k and uφpkq ă vψpkq, where φ and ψ are permutations that
sort u and v non-decreasingly. We write u ălex v. If uφpiq “ vψpiq for all i P t1, . . . , nu, we
write u “lex v.
Proving that ∆pxq sorted lexicographically increases implies that Restore does not cycle,
and thus, as the strategy space is finite, terminates. In general, under the hypothesis
that ∆pxq lexicographically increases, we obtain the following (finite) sequence of strategy
profiles within a while-loop:
xÑ xb1 Ñ x
b
2 Ñ ¨ ¨ ¨ Ñ x
b
qb
“ xf1 Ñ x
f
2 Ñ ¨ ¨ ¨ Ñ x
f
qf
“ x1. (10)
We introduce two types of vectors that help us prove that ∆pxq ălex ∆px
1q. Let q be the
iteration in the backward path where a player moves a packet from e´q`1 to e
´
q . We define
values Bq,´ki,e pxq and B
q,`k
i,minpxq as follows:
B
q,´k
i,e pxq “
$’&
’%
µ´ki,e pxq ` k
2ai,e, if e
´
q ‰ e
`
1 and e “ e
´
q ,
µ´ki,e pxq ´ k
2ai,e, if e
´
q ‰ e
`
1 and e “ e
`
1 ,
µ´ki,e pxq, otherwise.
(11)
B
q,`k
i,minpxq “
$’&
’%
µ`ki,minpxq ` k
2ai,e, if e
´
q ‰ e
`
1 and e
´
q “ argminµ
`k
i,e pxq,
µ`ki,minpxq ´ k
2ai,e, if e
´
q ‰ e
`
1 and e
`
1 “ argminµ
`k
i,e pxq,
µ`ki,minpxq, otherwise.
(12)
As k is fixed within Restore, we write Bq,´i,e pxq and B
q,`
i,minpxq instead. We define:
B
q
i pxq “ pB
q,`
i,minpxq ´B
q,´
i,e pxqqePE and B
qpxq “ pBq,`i,minpxq ´B
q,´
i,e pxqqiPN ;ePE .
Let q be the iteration in the forward path, where some player moves a packet from e`q to
e`q`1. We define values F
q,´k
i,e pxq and F
q,`k
i,minpxq as follows:
F
q,´k
i,e pxq “
#
µ´ki,e pxq ´ k
2ai,e, if e “ e
`
q ,
µ´ki,e pxq, otherwise.
(13)
F
q,`k
i,minpxq “
#
µ`ki,minpxq ´ k
2a
i,e
f
q
, if e`q “ argminµ
`k
i,e pxq,
µ`ki,minpxq, otherwise.
(14)
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Again, as k is fixed, we write F q,´i,e pxq and F
q,`
i,minpxq instead. We define:
F
q
i pxq “ pF
q,`
i,minpxq ´ F
q,´
i,e pxqqePE and F
qpxq “ pF q,`i,minpxq ´ F
q,´
i,e pxqqiPN ;ePE .
In order to show ∆pxq ălex ∆px
1q, we first prove that ∆pxq ălex B
1pxb1q ălex ¨ ¨ ¨ ălex
Bqbpxbqbq and F
1pxf1q ălex ¨ ¨ ¨ ălex F
qf pxfqf q, which shows that (10) is actually well-defined.
Lemma 5.3. Let x, xbq and x
f
q be strategy profiles as described in Restore, then ∆pxq ălex
B1pxb1q ălex ¨ ¨ ¨ ălex B
qbpxbqbq and F
1pxf1 q ălex ¨ ¨ ¨ ălex F
qf pxfqf q.
Proof. We first prove that ∆pxq ălex B
1pxb1q. Remember that there exists an i P N such
that xb1 “ xi:e`
1
Ñe´
1
. Using Equation (11) and (12), for all players j ‰ i, it holds that:
B
1,´
j,e px
b
1q “ µ
´k
j,e pxq and B
1,`
j,minpx
b
1q “ µ
`k
j,minpxq.
So, for all players j ‰ i, we have ∆jpxq “lex B
1
j px
b
1q. Hence, it is left to prove that
∆ipxq ălex B
1
i px
b
1q. As argminePEtµ
`k
i,e px
b
1qu ‰ H, at least one of the following is true: (I)
f P argminePEtµ
`k
i,e px
b
1qu for some f P Ezte
`
1 , e
´
1 u, (II) e
`
1 P argminePEtµ
`k
i,e px
b
1qu or (III)
e´1 P argminePEtµ
`k
i,e px
b
1qu. As all three cases are proven similarly, we only will prove the
first case here. Proofs for the other two cases can be found in Appendix D. For the first
case, assume that f P argminePEtµ
`k
i,e px
b
1qu for some f P Ezte
`
1 , e
´
1 u. For resource e
`
2 we
have:
B
1,`
i,minpx
b
1q ´B
1,´
i,e`
1
pxb1q
“ µ`ki,minpx
b
1q ´ pµ
´k
i,e`
1
pxb1q ´ ai,e`
1
k2q pby Definition 11 and 12q
ą µ`ki,f px
b
1q ´ µ
´k
i,e`
1
pxb1q pas f “ argmin
ePE
tµ`ki,e px
b
1quq
“ µ`ki,f pxq ´ µ
`k
i,e`
1
pxq pas µ`ki,f px
b
1q “ µ
`k
i,f pxq
and µ´k
i,e`
1
pxb1q “ µ
`k
i,e`
1
pxqq
ą µ`ki,f pxq ´ µ
´k
i,e´
1
pxq pas µ`k
i,e`
1
pxq ă µ´k
i,e´
1
pxqq
ě µ`ki,minpxq ´ µ
´k
i,e´
1
pxq. pby definition of µ`ki,minpxqq
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For resource e´1 we have:
B
1,`
i,minpx
b
1q ´B
1,´
i,e´
1
pxb1q
“ µ`ki,f px
b
1q ´ pµ
´k
i,e´
1
pxb1q ` k
2a
i,e´
1
q pby Definition 11 and 12q
“ µ`ki,f pxq ´ pµ
´k
i,e´
1
pxq ´ k2ai,e´
1
q pas µ`ki,e1px
b
1q “ µ
`k
i,e1pxq
and µ´k
i,e´
1
pxb1q “ µ
´k
i,e´
1
pxq ´ 2k2a
i,e´
1
q
ą µ`ki,minpxq ´ µ
´k
i,e´
1
pxq. pby definition of µ`ki,minpxqq
For resource e P Eze`1 , e
´
1 we have:
B
1,`
i,minpx
b
1q ´B
1,´
i,e px
b
1q
“ µ`ki,e1px
b
1q ´ µ
´k
i,e px
b
1q pby Definition 11 and 12q
“ µ`ki,e1pxq ´ µ
´k
i,e pxq. pas µ
`k
i,e1px
b
1q “ µ
`k
i,e1pxq
and µ´ki,e px
b
1q “ µ
´k
i,e pxqq
Thus when e1 “ argminePEtµ
`k
i,e px
b
1qu, we have ∆ipxq ălex B
1
i px
b
1q. Hence, ∆pxq ălex
B1pxb1q.
The argumentation above depends on three crucial factors:
• The fact that xb1 “ xi:e´
1
Ñe`
1
.
• This is a restricted improving move for player i (thus, µ`k
i,e`
1
pxq ă µ´k
i,e´
1
pxq).
• The relation between µ´ki,e pxq and B
1,´
i,e pxq and the relation between µ
`k
i,minpxq and
B
1,´
i,minpxq.
Similar relations hold for xbq, x
b
q`1, B
qpxq and Bq`1pxq. Thus, using the same arguments
as above, Bqpxbqq ălex B
q`1pxbq`1q for all q P t1, . . . qb ´ 1u. The same holds for x
f
q , x
f
q`1,
F qpxq and F q`1pxq. Hence, F qpxfq q ălex F
q`1pxfq`1q for all q P t1, . . . qf ´ 1u. Thus,
∆pxq ălex B
1pxb1q ălex ¨ ¨ ¨ ălex B
qbpxbqbq and F
1pxf1q ălex ¨ ¨ ¨ ălex F
qf pxfqf q.
Hence, the backward path and the forward path end after a finite number of steps. We
need two more lemmas to connect vectors ∆pxq, Bqpxq and F qpxq.
Definition 5.4. Let α P Q and y P Q|I| for a finite set I. We define function #pα, yq to
output the number of times that α occurs in y.
Lemma 5.5. Let x and xbqb be as in Restore, and assume that e
`
1 ‰ e
´
qb
. If ∆pxq ălex
Bqbpxbqbq, then ∆pxq ălex F
1pxbqbq and #p∆minpxq, F
1pxbqbqq ď #p∆minpxq, B
qbpxbqbqq.
Proof. If for all i P N and e P E we have:
B
qb,`
i,minpx
b
qb
q ´Bqb,´i,e px
b
qb
q ď F 1,`i,minpx
b
qb
q ´ F 1,´i,e px
b
qb
q,
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then ∆pxq ălex B
qbpxbqbq ďlex F
1pxbqbq and the lemma follows. Therefore, assume that for
some i P N and e P E we have:
B
qb,`
i,minpx
b
qb
q ´Bqb,´i,e px
b
qb
q ą F 1,`i,minpx
b
qb
q ´ F 1,´i,e px
b
qb
q.
Using the definitions of F 1,´i,e pxq, F
1,`
i,minpxq, B
qb,´
i,e pxq and B
qb,`
i,minpxq we obtain:
F
1,´
i,e pxq “
#
B
qb,´
i,e pxq ´ ai,ek, if e “ e
´
qb
,
B
qb,´
i,e pxq, otherwise.
F
1,`
i,minpxq “
#
B
qb,`
i,minpxq ´ ai,ek, if e
´
qb
“ argmintµ`ki,e pxqu,
B
qb,`
i,minpxq, otherwise.
Therefore, e´qb “ argminµ
`k
i,e px
b
qb
q, which implies:
B
qb,`
i,minpx
b
qb
q ´Bqb,´i,e px
b
qb
q
ą F 1,`
i,e´qb
pxbqbq ´ F
1,´
i,e px
b
qb
q pas e´qb “ argminµ
`k
i,e px
b
qb
qq
ě µ`k
i,e´qb
pxbqbq ´ µ
´k
i,e px
b
qb
q pas e´qb ‰ e
`
1 q
ě 0. pas e´qb is the end of the backward pathq
Thus, if Bqbpxbqbq ąlex F
1pxbqbq, it is caused by some positive values in B
qbpxbqbq decreasing to
some smaller positive values in F 1pxbqbq. As x is not an equilibrium, ∆pxq contains a negative
value that is increased by the initial restricted best response. Thus, if ∆pxq ălex B
qbpxbqbq,
then ∆pxq ălex F
1pxbqbq. Moreover, as ∆minpxq ă 0:
#p∆minpxq, F
1pxbqbqq ď #p∆minpxq, B
qbpxbqbqq.
Lemma 5.6. Let xfqf be as described in Restore. If ∆pxq ălex F
qf pxfqf q, then ∆pxq ălex
∆pxfqf q. Moreover, #p∆minpxq,∆px
f
qf qq ď #p∆minpxq, F
qf pxfqf qq.
Proof. If for all i P N and e P E we have:
F
qf ,`
i,minpx
f
qf
q ´ F
qf ,´
i,e px
f
qf
q ď µ`ki,minpx
f
qf
q ´ µ´ki,e px
f
qf
q,
then ∆pxq ălex F
qf pxfqf q ďlex ∆px
f
qf q and the lemma follows. Therefore, assume that for
some i P N and e P E we have:
F
qf ,`
i,minpx
f
qf
q ´ F
qf ,´
i,e px
f
qf
q ą µ`ki,minpx
f
qf
q ´ µ´ki,e px
f
qf
q.
Definition 13 and 14 imply that in this case e “ e`qf . As e
`
qf
is the end of the backward path,
for all i P N we have either (I) e`qf R argmaxtµ
´k
i,e px
f
qf qu or (II) µ
`k
i,minpx
f
qf q´µ
´k
i,maxpx
f
qf q ě 0.
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In the first case assume e1 P argmaxtµ´ki,e px
f
qf qu:
µ`ki,minpx
f
qf
q ´ µ´k
i,e`qf
pxfqf q
ą µ`ki,minpx
f
qf
q ´ µ´ki,e1px
f
qf
q pas e1qf P argmaxtµ
´k
i,e px
f
qf
quq
ě F
qf ,`
i,minpx
f
qf
q ´ F
qf ,´
i,e1 px
f
qf
q pas e`qf ‰ e
1q
ě ∆minpxq. pas ∆pxq ălex F
qf pxfqf qq
In the second case, as 0 ą ∆minpxq:
µ`ki,minpx
f
qf
q ´ µ´k
i,e`qf
pxfqf q ě 0 ą ∆minpxq.
Thus, if F qf pxfqf q ąlex ∆px
f
qf q, it is caused by some values in F
qf pxfqf q decreasing to some
values in ∆pxfqf q that are larger than ∆minpxq. Thus, if ∆pxq ălex F
qf pxfqf q, then ∆pxq ălex
∆pxfqf q. Moreover, #p∆minpxq,∆px
f
qf qq ď #p∆minpxq, F
qf pxfqf qq.
Using Lemma 5.3, 5.5 and 5.6 we prove the following statement.
Lemma 5.7. Let x and x1 be defined as in the while-loop (lines 2-15) of Restore. Then
∆pxq ălex ∆px
1q, and moreover, #p∆minpxq,∆pxqq ą #p∆minpxq,∆px
1qq.
Proof of Lemma 5.7. We first prove that ∆pxq ălex ∆px
1q. Lemma 5.3 implies:
∆pxq ălex B
1pxb1q ălex ¨ ¨ ¨ ălex B
qbpxbqbq.
If e`1 “ e
´
qb
, Definition (11) and (12) imply that Bqbpxbqbq “ ∆px
b
qb
q. Hence, ∆pxq ălex
∆pxbqbq “ ∆px
1q. On the other hand, if e`1 ‰ e
´
qb
, we combine the fact that ∆pxq ălex
Bqbpxbqbq with Lemma 5.5 to obtain: ∆pxq ălex F
1pxbqbq “ F
1pxf1 q. Lemma 5.3 implies:
F 1pxf1q ďlex ¨ ¨ ¨ ďlex F
qf pxfqf q.
Hence, ∆pxq ălex F
qf pxfqf q. We use Lemma 5.6 to obtain the desired result:
∆pxq ălex ∆px
f
qf
q “lex ∆px
1q.
Therefore, if x and x1 are as defined in the while-loop, then ∆pxq ălex ∆px
1q. For the
second part of the lemma, we have:
#p∆minpxq,∆pxqq
ą #p∆minpxq, B
1pxb1qq pas min
iPN
tµ`kj,minpxq ´ µ
´k
j,maxu “ ∆minpxqq
ě #p∆minpxq, B
qbpxbqbqq pas B
1pxb1q ălex B
qbpxbqbqq
“ #p∆minpxq, F
1pxf1 qq pby Lemma 5.5 and as x
b
qb
“ xf1q
ě #p∆minpxq, F
qf pxfqf qq pas F
1pxf1 q ălex F
qf pxfqf qq
ě #p∆minpxq,∆px
1qq. pby Lemma 5.6 and as xfqf “ x
1q
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If x1 “ xbqb , then B
qbpxbqbq “ ∆px
1q. Thus, both when x1 “ xbqb and x
1 “ xfqf :
#p∆minpxq,∆pxqq ą #p∆minpxq,∆px
1qq.
As ∆pxq lexicographically increases after each loop and the strategy space S is finite,
Restore terminates.
5.2 Correctness PacketHalver
It is left to prove that PacketHalver returns an equilibrium for game Gk0ppdiqiPN .
Theorem 5.8. Given a k0-integral splittable singleton game with affine player-specific cost
functions Gk0 :“ pN,E, pdiqiPN , ppci,eqePEqiPN q, PacketHalver returns an equilibrium for
Gk0.
Proof. Strategy profile x1 is initialized as the all-zero strategy profile, hence, an equilibrium
for the game G2q1k0p~0q. Assume that in iteration q we enter the for-loop in PacketHalver
with an equilibrium x for game G2q1´q`1k0 with demands d
1
i “ di ´ pdi mod 2
q1´q`1k0q.
First algorithm Restore computes an equilibrium for packet size 2q1´qk0 and demands
d1i “ di ´ pdi mod 2
q1´qk0q. In lines 5-10 of PacketHalver we check for each player
i P N if her unscheduled load satisfies di´d
1
i ě 2
q1´qk0. If so, we schedule one extra packet
for player i using subroutine Add. Thus, after the q’th iteration in the for-loop, we obtain
an equilibrium for packet size 2q1´qk0 and demands d
1
i “ di ´ pdi mod 2
q1´qk0q. Hence,
after the q1’th iteration we obtain an equilibrium for packet size 2
0k0 “ k0 and demands
d1i “ di ´ pdi mod k0q “ di, which is an equilibrium for game Gk0ppdiqiPN q.
6 Running Time
We prove that the running time of PacketHalver is polynomially bounded in n, m, log k
and log δ, where δ is the upper bound on player-specific demands di. For this, we first need
to analyze the running time of the two subroutines Add and Restore.
6.1 Running Time Add
In [24, Corollary 5.2] Harks et al. proved that it takes time nmpδ{kq2 to execute Add.
If their algorithm is applied to games with singleton strategy spaces and player-specific
affine cost functions, the running time reduces to Opnm4q. The main reason for this is that
equilibria are not very sensitive under small changes in demands.
Lemma 6.1. Let xk be an equilibrium for game GkppdiqiPN q and let xq be the strategy profile
after the q’th iteration of the while-loop described in lines 4-7 of Add. Then |pxkqi,e ´
pxqqi,e| ă 2mk for all i P N and e P E.
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Proof. On the contrary, assume that q is the first iteration in which we obtain |pxqqi,e ´
pxkqi,e| “ 2mk for some i P N and e P E. There are two cases: either (I)pxqqi,e ´ pxkqi,e “
2mk or (II)pxkqi,e ´ pxqqi,e “ 2mk. We prove that the first case leads to a contradiction.
For the second case a contradiction can be obtained in a similar manner.
Harks, Peis and Klimm [23] proved that only the players using a resource whose load
increased in the previous iteration may have an improving move, and if so, a best response
consists in moving one packet from this resource to another one. This implies that pxkqe ď
pxqqe ď pxkqe ` k for all e P E. Thus, when assuming pxqqi,e “ pxkqi,e ` 2mk, we obtain:
pxqqe ` pxqqi,e ě pxkqe ` pxkqi,e ` 2mk. (15)
Remember that the total load distributed in xq by player i exceeds the total load distributed
in xk by at most k, and hence
ř
fPEpxqqi,e ď k `
ř
fPEpxkqi,e. We obtain:ÿ
f‰e
pxqqi,e ď
ÿ
f‰e
pxkqi,e ` p1´ 2mqk ă
ÿ
f‰e
pxkqi,e ´ 2pm´ 1qk.
The pigeonhole principle implies that there exists an f P E with pxqqi,f ă pxkqi,f ´ 2k and
hence pxqqi,f ď pxkqi,f ´ 3k. Combined with inequality pxkqf ď pxqqf ď pxkqf ` k, this
implies:
pxqqi,f ` pxqqf ď pxkqi,f ` pxkqf ´ 2k. (16)
As q is the first iteration in which pxqqi,e ´ pxkqi,e “ 2mk, we have xq “ pxq´1qi:e1Ñe for
some e1 P E. Using inequalities (15), (16), m ą 1 and the fact that xk is an equilibrium for
packet size k, we obtain:
µ´ki,e pxqq ą µ
`k
i,e pxkq ě µ
´k
i,f pxkq ě µ
`k
i,f pxqq.
This, combined with the fact that pxqqi,e ą pxkqi,e ě 0, implies player i can decrease her
cost by moving a packet from e to f . This contradicts the fact that in strategy profile xq´1
moving a packet to e is a restricted best response for player i.
Lemma 6.2. Algorithm Add has running time Opnm4q.
Proof. We use the same proof strategy as used in [23, Proof of Theorem 5.1], and give each
unit of demand of each player i P N an identity denoted by ij , for j P t1, . . . diu. For a
strategy profile x, we define epij , xq P E to be the resource to which unit ij is assigned
in strategy profile x. Let xq be the strategy profile after line 5 of the algorithm has been
executed for the q’th time, where we use the convention that x0 denotes the preliminary
strategy profile when entering the while-loop. Note that there is a unique resource e0 such
that px0qe0 “ xe0 ` k and px0qe “ xe for all e P Ezte0u. Furthermore, because we choose
in Line 5 a restricted best response, a simple inductive argument shows that after each
iteration q of the while-loop, there is a unique resource eq P E such that px0qeq “ xeq ` k
and px0qe “ xe for all e P Eztequ.
For any xq during the course of the algorithm, we define the marginal cost of packet ij
under profile xq as:
∆ijpxqq “
#
ci,eppxqqeqpxqqi,e ´ ci,eppxqqe ´ kqppxqqi,e ´ kq “ µ
´k
i,e pxqq, if e “ epij , xqq “ eq,
ci,eppxqqe ` kqpxqqi,e ´ ci,eppxqqeqppxqqi,e ´ kq, if e “ epij , xqq ‰ eq.
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In [23, Proof of Theorem 5.1], Harks, Klimm and Peis prove that the sorted vector of
marginal costs ∆ijpxq lexicographically decreases during the while loop, and hence Algo-
rithm Add ends within finite time. It is left to prove that its running time is polynomial.
In order to do so, we assume that players move packets according to a Last In First Out
(LIFO) principle. Thus, whenever player i moves a packet away from eq, she moves the
packet that was placed on this resource last. We keep track of costs ∆ij , at the moment
that packet ij is moved. Assume that packet ij is moved in iterations q1, . . . qpij , then:
∆ij pxq1q
“ µ´ki,eq1
pxq1q pby definition of ∆ij and epij , xq1q “ eq1q
ą µ`ki,eq1`1
pxq1q pas moving packet ij is an improving move for player i q
“ µ´ki,eq1`1
pxq1`1q pby construction of xq1`1 q
“ µ´ki,eq2
pxq2q pas eq2 “ eq1`1 and by LIFO principle pxq2qi,eq2 “ pxq1`1qi,eq2
q
“ ∆ij pxq2q. pby definition of ∆ij and epij , xq2q “ eq2q
Using similar argumentation, we obtain:
∆ij pxq1q ą ∆ijpxq2q ą ¨ ¨ ¨ ą ∆ijpxqpij
q.
Note that in iterations q1, . . . qpij , ∆ij pxqℓq does not depend on the aggregated load pxqℓqeqℓ ,
as pxqℓqeqℓ “ px0qeqℓ ` k for each ℓ P t1, . . . , piju. Instead it only depends on the player-
specific load pxqℓqi,eqℓ . Lemma 6.1 implies that each player i P N will move at most
2m packets from each resource and hence there will occur at most 4m different values of
pxqℓqi,eqℓ . Thus, ∆ijpxqℓq can take 4m different values and each packet visits each resource
at most 4m times.
Hence, each player i moves at most 2m2 packets, and each packet visits each resource (m
resources) at most 4m times. Therefore the running time of Add is bounded by Opnm4q.
6.2 Running Time Restore
We analyze the running time of Restore. The crucial idea is that for each strategy profile
y (for a game with packet size k) obtained during the execution of Restore, we have both
|pye´px2kqe| ď 2mk (Lemma 6.3 and Lemma 6.4) and |yi,e´px2kqi,e| ă 2m
2k (Lemma 6.5)
for all i P N and e P E.
The first lemma follows trivially from the fact that Hpx, xbq1q P t0, 2ku and Hpx, x
f
q2q P
t0, 2ku.
Lemma 6.3. Let x2k be an equilibrium for game G2k and let x, x
b
q1
and xfq2 be as described
in Restore for q1 P t1, . . . , qbu and q2 P t1, . . . , qfu. If |xe ´ px2kqe| ă 2mk for all e P E,
then |pxbq1qe ´ px2kqe| ď 2mk and |px
f
q2qe ´ px2kqe| ď 2mk for all e P E.
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Lemma 6.3 is only useful when |x1e ´ px2kqe| ă 2mk for all x
1 obtained through the while
loop. Thus, for x1 we prove a slightly stronger result.
Lemma 6.4. Let x2k be an equilibrium for game G2k and let x and x
1 be as described in
Restore. If |xe ´ px2kqe| ă 2mk for all e P E, then |x
1
e ´ px2kqe| ă 2mk for all e P E.
Proof. If x1e “ px2kqe for all e P E the lemma follows trivially. Thus, assume that there
exists an e such x1e ‰ px2kqe. By construction of x
1, we have x1
e´qb
“ xe´qb
´ k, x1
e`qf
“
xe`qf
` k and x1e “ px2kqe for all e P Ezte
´
qb
, e`qf u. Thus, we only need to check that
(I) x1
e´qb
ą px2kqe´qb
´ 2mk and (II) x1
e`qf
ă px2kqe`qf
` 2mk. For the first case we note
that x1
e´qb
“ pxbqbqe´qb
. Algorithm 2 implies that pxbqbqe´qb
ą px2kqe´qb
´ 2mk. Hence x1
e´qb
ą
px2kqe´qb
´ 2mk. For the second case we note that x1
e´qb
“ pxfqf qe`qf
. Algorithm 5 implies that
pxfqf qe`qf
ă px2kqe`qf
` 2mk. Hence, x1
e`qf
ă px2kqe`qf
` 2mk. Thus, if |x1e ´ px2kqe| ă 2mk for
all e P E, then |x1e ´ px2kqe| ă 2mk.
Moreover, the difference in player-specific load on a resource between any strategy obtained
during Restore and equilibrium x2k is bounded by 2m
2k.
Lemma 6.5. Let x2k be an equilibrium for game G2k and let x, x
b
q and x
f
q be as described
in Restore. If |xe ´ px2kqe| ă 2mk and |xi,e ´ px2kqi,e| ă 2m
2k for all i P N and
e P E, then |pxbqqi,e ´ px2kqi,e| ă 2m
2k for all i P N , e P E and q P t1, . . . , qbu, and
|pxfq qi,e ´ px2kqi,e| ă 2m
2k for all i P N , e P E and q P t1, . . . , qfu.
Proof. As the proofs for both statements are almost identical, we only prove the first
statement here, which we do by using induction on q. Define e´0 :“ e
`
1 and x
b
0 :“ x, then
this statement is trivially true for q “ 0.
Thus, assume that |pxbqqi,e ´ px2kqi,e| ă 2m
2k, then we prove that |pxbq`1qi,e ´ px2kqi,e| ă
2m2k for each i P N and e P E. On the contrary, assume that there exists an i P N and an
e P E such that |pxbq`1qi,e ´ px2kqi,e| “ 2m
2k. There are two cases that we need to check:
(a) px2kqi,e´q`1
´ pxbq`1qi,e´q`1
“ 2m2k and (b) pxbq`1qi,e´q ´ px2kqi,e´q “ 2m
2k.
We first show that case (a) leads to a contradiction. Property B2 and line 7 in algorithm 2
imply that e´q`1 P argmaxtµ
´k
i,e px
b
qqu for all q P t0, . . . qb´ 1u. We use Lemma 6.3 to obtain:
pxbq`1qe´q`1
` pxbq`1qi,e´q`1
ď px2kqe´q`1
` px2kqi,e´q`1
´ 2mpm´ 1qk. (17)
As the total load distributed by player i is the same in xbq`1 and x2k, and so is the total
load in the system, we obtain:ÿ
e‰e´q`1
ppxbq`1qe ` px
b
q`1qi,eq ě
ÿ
e‰e´q`1
ppx2kqe ` px2kqi,eq ` 2mpm´ 1qk.
By the pigeonhole principle, there must exist at least one resource f P E such that:
pxbq`1qf ` px
b
q`1qi,f ě px2kqf ` px2kqi,f ` 2mk. (18)
Note that pxbq`1qi,f ą 0, as px
b
q`1qi,f “ 0 implies px
b
q`1qf ą px2kqf`2mk, which contradicts
the fact that |px2kqf ´ px
b
q`1qf | ď 2mk. We obtain:
µ´k
i,e´q`1
pxbqq “ µ
`k
i,e´q`1
pxbq`1q pas px
b
q`1q “ px
b
qqe´q`1Ñe
´
q
q
ă
1
2
µ´2k
i,e´q`1
px2kq pas m ě 2, this follows from equation (17)q
ď
1
2
µ`2ki,f px2kq pas x2k is an equilibrium for G2kq
ă µ´ki,f px
b
q`1q pas m ě 2, this follows from equation (18)q
ď µ´ki,f px
b
qq. pas f ‰ e
´
q`1q
This contradicts the fact that e´q`1 “ argmaxtµ
´k
i,e px
b
qqu.
For the second case we prove that pxbq`1qi,e´px2kqi,e “ 2m
2k leads to a contradiction. Note
that property B1 implies that xbq`1 is not obtained from x
b
q through lines 3-5 (of Restore),
but in lines 6-10 instead. Hence, e´q “ argmintµ
`k
i,e px
b
qqu. Using similar argumentation as in
the first case, we are able to show that there exists an f P Ezte´q u with µ
`k
i,f px
b
qq ă µ
`k
i,e´q
pxbqq,
contradicting the fact that e´q “ argmintµ
`k
i,e px
b
qqu.
The bounds on the total and player-specific load enable us to prove that Algorithm 2 and
Algorithm 5 run in polynomial time.
Lemma 6.6. Let x2k be an equilibrium for packet size 2k. And let x be a strategy profile for
packet size k such that |px2kqe´xe| ă mk for all e P E. Then Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 5
both have running time Opnm6q.
Proof. Similar as algorithm Add, we again work with a sequence of restricted best re-
sponses. As mentioned before, in [23, Proof of Theorem 5.1], Harks, Klimm and Peis prove
that the sorted vector of marginal costs as defined in Lemma 6.2 lexicographically decreases
during the while loop of improving moves.
Lemma 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 imply that for each player i P N and each resource e P E, at
most 4m2 different marginal cost values ∆ij can occur whenever a packet ij is moved
within a path of restricted best responses. Using the same argumentation as in Lemma 6.2,
this implies that each unit of demand for player i (m ¨ 2m2 units) visits each resource
(m resources) at most 4m2 times. Therefore the running time of both Algorithm 2 and
Algorithm 5.6 is bounded by Opnm6q.
We combine all previous results to prove Lemma 6.7.
Lemma 6.7. Restore has running time Opn2m14q.
Proof. The running time of Restore is dominated by the number of times we enter the
while-loop, and the running time of Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 5. Using Lemma 6.6 we
know that in each iteration, the running time of Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 5 is Opnm6q.
Hence, the running time of a complete iteration is Opnm6q.
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Note that Lemma 6.3 and Lemma 6.5 imply that on each resource e at most Opm3q different
values µ´ki,e p¨q can occur and Opm
4q different values µ`ki,minp¨q. Thus, for each player at most
Opm7q different values µ`ki,minp¨q ´ µ
´k
i,e p¨q can appear on a resource, thus Opnm
8q different
values in total. In Lemma 5.7 we prove that #p∆minpxq,∆pxqq decreases after each iteration
in the while-loop, Hence we enter the while-loop at most Opnm8q times.
As we enter the while-loop at most Opnm8q times, and each iteration runs in Opnm6q,
PacketHalver runs in Opn2m14q.
6.3 Running Time PacketHalver
Finally, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.8. PacketHalver runs in time Opn2m14 logpδ{k0qq.
Proof. Note that we picked q1 P N to be the smallest number such that 2
q1k0 ą di for all
player-specific demands di. This implies that q1 is bounded in Oplogpδ{k0qq, where δ is
an upper bound on the player-specific demands. Thus, we execute lines 3-10 Oplogpδ{k0qq
times. In line 4 we call Restore, which runs in Opn2m14q. In line 5´ 9 we execute Add
(which runs in Opnm6q) at most n times. Thus, the computation time of lines 5 ´ 10 is
Opn2m6q. This implies that it takes time Opn2m14q to go through a complete iteration in
the for loop. Thus, PacketHalver runs in time Opn2m14 logpδ{k0qq.
It is left to show that in an atomic splittable game G, logp1{k0q is polynomially bounded
in the input.
O
ˆ
log
ˆ
1
k0
˙˙
“ O
˜
log
˜
2m2p2amaxq
nmpnmqnm{2
anm
gcd
¸¸
“ O
˜
logm` log pdetpAqq ` log
˜
1
anm
gcd
¸¸
“ O
˜
logm` logppnmq
1
2
nm ¨ p2amaxq
nmq ` log
˜ź
iPN
di
˜ź
ePEi
ai,e ¨ bi,e
¸¸¸
“ O
˜
nm logpnmamaxq `
ÿ
iPN
˜
logpdiq `
ÿ
ePEi
`
logpai,eq ` logpbi,eq
˘¸¸
.
Which is indeed polynomial in the size of the input. Remember that if we are computing
an atomic splittable equilibrium, we first compute the k0 splittable equilibrium using the
algorithm above. Second, we compute the exact equilibrium in time Oppnmq3q.
Corollary 6.9. Given game G, we can compute an atomic splittable equilibrium for G in
running time:
O
ˆ
pnmq3 ` n2m14 log
ˆ
δ
k0
˙˙
.
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7 Multimarket Cournot Oligopoly
In this section, we derive a strong connection between atomic splittable singleton congestion
games and multimarket Cournot oligopolies. Such a game is compactly represented by the
tuple
M “ pN,E, pEiqiPN , ppi,eqiPN,ePEi , pCiqiPN q,
where N is a set of n firms and E a set ofm markets. Each firm i only has access to a subset
Ei Ď E of the markets. Each market e is endowed with firm-specific, non-increasing, affine
price functions pi,eptq “ si,e´ri,et, i P N . In a strategy profile, a firm chooses a non-negative
production quantity xi,e P Rě0 for each market e P Ei. We denote a strategy profile for a
firm by xi “ pxi,eqePEi , and a joint strategy profile by x “ pxiqiPN . The production costs
of a firm are of the form Ciptq “ cit
2 for some ci ě 0. The goal of each firm i P N is to
maximize its utility, which is given by:
uipxq “
ÿ
ePEi
pi,epxeqxi,e ´Ci
´ ÿ
ePEi
xi,e
¯
,
where xe :“
ř
iPN xi,e. In the rest of this section we prove that several results that hold for
atomic splittable equilibria and k-splittable equilibria carry over to multimarket oligopolies.
A strategic game G “ pN, pXqiPN , puiqi P Nq is defined by a set of players N , a set of
feasible strategies Xi for each player i P N and a pay-off function uipxq for each i P N ,
where x P
Ś
iPN Xi.
Definition 7.1. Let G “ pN, pXiqiPN , puiqi P Nq and H “ pN, pYiqiPN , pviqi P Nq be two
strategic games with identical player set N . Then, G and H are called isomorphic, if for
all i P N there exists a bijective function φi : Xi Ñ Yi and Ai P R such that:
uipx1, . . . xnq “ νipφ1px1q, . . . , φnpxnqq `Ai.
Let G “ pN, pXiqiPN , puiqi P Nq and H “ pN, pYiqiPN , pviqi P Nq be isomorphic games.
Then, pxiqiPN is an equilibrium of game G if and only if pφipxiqqiPN is an equilibrium of
game H. This implies that pxiqiPN is the unique equilibrium of game G if and only if
pφipxiqqiPN is the unique equilibrium of game H.
We prove that for each multimarket oligopoly, there exists an isomorphic atomic splittable
game. Moreover, we can construct the isomorphism in polynomial time.
Theorem 7.2. Given a multimarket oligopoly M, there exists an atomic splittable game G
that is isomorphic to M.
Proof. Given multimarket oligopoly M, we construct an atomic splittable singleton game
G as follows. For every firm i P N we create a player i and we define the demand di for
this player as an upper bound on the maximal quantity that firm i will produce, that is,
di :“
ÿ
ePEi
maxtt | pi,eptq “ 0u.
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Note that if we limit the strategy space for each player i P N in game M to strategies x
satisfying
ř
ePEi
xi,e ď di, all equilibria are preserved. Then, for every player i we introduce
a special resource ei, and we define the set of allowable resources for this player as:
E˜i “ Ei Y teiu with ei ‰ ej for i ‰ j.
The cost on these special resources ei are defined as:
ci,eiptq :“ cipt´ 2diq for all i P N.
The cost on resources e P Ei are defined as:
ci,eptq :“ ´pi,eptq “ ri,et´ si,e for all i P N.
In order to guarantee affine cost functions with only non-negative constant terms, one can
add a large positive constant cmax to every cost function. We define:
cmax “ max ttsi,e | for all i P N, e P Eiu Y t2cidi | for all i P Nuu .
Note that adding cmax to every cost function does not change the equilibrium, it only adds
dicmax to the total cost of each player. The total cost of a strategy x for player i in game
G is:
πipx
1q “
ÿ
ePE˜i
ci,epx
1
eqx
1
i,e,
which is equal to:
πipx
1q “
ÿ
ePEi
´pi,epx
1
eqx
1
i,e ` x
1
i,ei
cipx
1
i,ei
´ 2diq. (19)
Note that the payoff function of player i in x1 is vipx
1q “ ´πipx
1q. It is left to prove that
game G is isomorphic to gameM. Let x be a feasible strategy in gameM. For each i P N ,
we define the bijective function φi : Ei Ñ E˜ as:
φipxi,1, . . . , xi,mq “ pxi,1, . . . , xi,m, di ´
ÿ
ePEi
xi,eq “: px
1
i,1, . . . , x
1
i,m, x
1
i,m`1q.
As we limited the strategy space for each player i P N in game M to strategies x whereř
ePEi
xi,e ď di, x
1 :“ φpxq is a feasible strategy in G. For each feasible strategy x for game
M, and for each i P N , we have:
uipxq “
ÿ
ePEi
pi,epxeqxi,e ´ Ci
´ ÿ
ePEi
xi,e
¯
“
ÿ
ePEi
pi,epxeqxi,e ´ ci
´ ÿ
ePEi
xi,e
¯2
“
ÿ
ePEi
pi,epxeqxi,e ´ ci
´
di ´
ÿ
ePEi
xi,e
¯´
´ di ´
ÿ
ePEi
xi,e
¯
´ cid
2
i
“
ÿ
ePEi
pi,epxeqxi,e ´ ci
´
di ´
ÿ
ePEi
xi,e
¯´
di ´
ÿ
ePEi
xi,e ´ 2di
¯
´ cid
2
i
“ ´πipφ1px1q, . . . , φ1pxnqq ´ cid
2
i
“ vipφ1px1q, . . . , φ1pxnqq ´ cid
2
i .
Thus, game M and G are isomorphic.
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Remark 7.3. Given a multimarket oligopoly M, one can construct an atomic splittable
singleton game isomorphic to M within running time Opnmq.
One of the main results of this paper is our polynomial time algorithm that finds the
unique equilibrium for atomic splittable singleton congestion games with linear cost func-
tions within polynomial time. As for each multimarket oligopoly there exists an atomic
splittable game isomorphic to it, we are also able to construct this unique equilibrium
within polynomial time.
Theorem 7.4. Given a multimarket oligopoly M, an equilibrium can be computed within
running time:
O
ˆ
n16m14 log
ˆ
δ
k0
˙˙
.
Proof. This theorem follows directly from the fact that we can construct an atomic split-
table singleton game G isomorphic to M (Theorem 7.2) and the fact that x “ pxiqiPN is
an equilibrium in G if and only if x “ pφipxiqqiPN is an equilibrium in M. Note that if in
M, firms compete over m markets, the isomorphic atomic splittable singleton game G has
m` n resources. For such a game, Corollary 6.9 implies that an equilibrium can be found
in
O
ˆ
n3pm` nq3 ` n2pm` nq14 log
ˆ
δ
k0
˙˙
“ O
ˆ
n16m14 log
ˆ
δ
k0
˙˙
.
In an integral multimarket oligopoly players sell indivisible goods. Thus, players can only
produce and sell integer quantities, i.e., xi,e P Ně0 for each i P N and e P Ei. For these
games, we can construct an isomorphic 1-splittable congestion game.
Theorem 7.5. Given an integral multimarket oligopolyM, we can construct an 1-splittable
congestion game G isomorphic to M within running time Opnmq.
Proof. We define
di :“
ÿ
ePEi
tmaxtt | pi,eptq “ 0uu.
Then, the theorem follows using the same construction as in Theorem 7.2.
Corollary 7.6. Given an integral multimarket oligopoly M, an integral equilibrium can be
computed within
O
ˆ
n16m14 log
ˆ
δ
k0
˙˙
.
Proof. Theorem 7.5 implies that we can construct an atomic splittable singleton game G
isomorphic to M. Note that if in M, n firms compete over m markets, the isomorphic
atomic splittable singleton game hasm`n resources. For such a game, Theorem 6.8 implies
the desired running time.
Lastly, we extend a very recent result by Todd [43], where the total and individual produc-
tion in one market in an integer equilibrium and a real equilibrium are compared.
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Theorem 7.7. Given an multimarket oligopoly M, with real equilibrium pxiqiPN . Then,
for any integer equilibrium pyiqiPN :
• |xe ´ ye| ď m` n.
• |xi,e ´ yi,e| ď pm` nq
2.
Proof. Assume that in game M, n firms compete over m markets. According to Theo-
rem 7.2, there exists an atomic splittable congestion game G on m ` k resources that is
isomorphic to M using bijection φ.
Let x “ pxiqiPN be an atomic splittable equilibrium of M and let y “ pyiqiPN be a 1-
splittable equilibrium of M. Then x1 :“ pφipxiqqiPN is an atomic splittable equilibrium
of G and y1 :“ pφipyiqqiPN is a 1-splittable equilibrium of G. According to Lemma 3.2
and 3.3 we know that for any real equilibrium x1 and 1-splittable equilibrium y1 it holds
that |x1e ´ y
1
e| ă pm` nq and |x
1
i,e ´ y
1
i,e| ă pm` nq
2| for all i P N and e P Ei. Then, using
the bijection φ described in (19), we get |xe´ye| ă pm`nq and |xi,e´yi,e| ă pm`nq
2.
Todd [43] showed that the total production in a 1-splittable equilibrium is in the worst-case
at most n{2 away from that in the real equilibrium, and the individual firm’s choice can
be more that pn´ 1q{4 away from her choice in the real equilibrium. Our bounds a larger
than Todd’s, yet, they hold for a more general model – multiple markets and firm-specific
price functions. We pose as an open question, whether or not our bounds are tight or can
be further improved.
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A Atomic Splittable Congestion Games as LCP
Assume we are given an atomic splittable congestion game G as defined in Section 2.1.
Given M, q as below, any solution for the linear complementarity problem LCP pM, qq
leads to an equilibrium in atomic splittable congestion game G. Matrix M and vector q are
given by:
M :“
»
————————————————————————–
2a1,1 0 . . . 0 . . . a1,1 0 . . . 0 ´1 0 . . . 0
0 2a1,2 . . . 0 . . . 0 a1,2 . . . 0 ´1 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
... . . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 2a1,m . . . 0 0 . . . a1,m ´1 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
an,1 0 . . . 0 . . . 2an,1 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . ´1
0 an,2 . . . 0 . . . 0 2an,2 . . . 0 0 0 . . . ´1
...
...
. . .
... . . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . an,m . . . 0 0 . . . 2an,m 0 0 . . . ´1
1 1 . . . 1 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
... . . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 0 . . . 1 1 . . . 1 0 0 . . . 0
fi
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffifl
,
qT :“
“
b1,1 b1,2 . . . b1,m . . . bn,1 bn,2 . . . bn,m ´d1 ´d2 . . . ´dn
‰
.
We denote any solution z that is a solution to this LPC as:
zT :“
“
x1,1 x1,2 . . . x1,m . . . xn,1 xn,2 . . . xn,m λ1 λ2 . . . λn
‰
.
Then, pxi,eqiPN,ePE forms an atomic splittable equilibrium.
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B Forward Path of Restricted Best Responses
Algorithm 5: FPpx2k, x
f
1 , e
`
1 ,Gkq : A forward path of restricted best responses.
Input: equilibrium x2k for game G2k, strategy profile x
f
1 for game Gk, a resource e
`
1
and game Gk.
Output: Strategy profile xfqf for game Gk and resource e
`
q .
1 Initialize q Ð 1;
2 repeat
3 if pxfq qe`q ě px2kqe`q ` 2mk then
4 Find player i and resource e`q`1 satisfying properties:
5 F1. pxbqqi,e`q ą px2kqi,e`q ;
6 F2. e`q`1 P argmintµ
`k
i,e px
f
q qu ;
7 F3. µ´k
i,e`q
pxfq q ą µ
`k
i,e`q`1
pxfq q ;
8 x
f
q`1 Ð px
f
q qi:e`q Ñe`q`1
;
9 q Ð q ` 1;
10 end
11 while Di P N with e`q “ argmaxePEtµ
´k
i,e px
f
q qu and µ
`k
i,minpx
f
q q ă µ
´k
i,maxpx
f
q q do
12 Choose e`q`1 P argmintµ
`k
i,e px
f
q qu;
13 x
f
q`1 Ð px
f
q qe`q Ñe`q`1
;
14 q Ð q ` 1;
15 end
16 until pxfq qe`q ă px2kqe`q ` 2mk;
17 return pxfq , e`q q
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C Full Proof of Lemma 5.1
Full proof of Lemma 5.1. We introduce two player sets N`e , N
´
e for every resource e P E,
where:
N`e “ ti P N |px2kqi,e ą px
b
qqi,eu and N
´
e “ ti P N |px2kqi,e ă px
b
qqi,eu.
Note that for every i P N`e we have:
pxbqqe´q ` px
b
qqi,e´q ă px2kqe´q ` px2kqi,e´q ´ 2mk. (20)
Using the player sets, we obtain:ÿ
iPN`
e
´
q
ppx2kqi,e´q ´ px
b
qqi,e´q q `
ÿ
iPN´
e
´
q
ppx2kqi,e´q ´ px
b
qqi,e´q q “ px2kqe´q ´ px
b
qqe´q ě 2mk.
As
ř
iPN´
e
´
q
ppx2kqi,e´q ´ px
b
qqi,e´q q ď 0, we have:
ÿ
iPN`
e
´
q
ppx2kqi,e´q ´ px
b
qqi,e´q q ě 2mk.
The total load distributed by a player does not change, therefore:ÿ
f‰e´q
ÿ
iPN`
e
´
q
ppx2kqi,f ´ px
b
qqi,f q ď ´2mk.
For every resource f P Ezte´q u we split N
`
e´q
in two parts: N`
e´q
XN´f and N
`
e´q
XN`f :
ÿ
f‰e´q
ÿ
iPN`
e
´
q
XN´
f
ppx2kqi,f ´ px
b
qqi,f q `
ÿ
iPN`
e
´
q
XN`
f
ppx2kqi,f ´ px
b
qqi,f q ď ´2mk.
Using the definition of N`f , we obtain:ÿ
f‰e´q
ÿ
iPN`
e
´
q
XN´
f
ppx2kqi,f ´ px
b
qqi,f q ď ´2mk. (21)
As px2kqe´q ´ px
b
qqe´q ě 2mk, we have
ř
f‰e´q
ppx2kqf ´ px
b
qqf q ď ´2mk. Therefore:ÿ
f‰e´q
ÿ
iPN`
e
´
q
XN´
f
ppx2kqf ´ px
b
qqf q ď ´|N
`
e´q
XN´f |2mk.
We add this to equation (21) to obtain the following:ÿ
f‰e´q
ÿ
iPN`
e
´
q
XN´
f
ppx2kqf ´ px
b
qqf q ` ppx2kqi,f ´ px
b
qqi,f q ď ´p|N
`
e´q
XN´f | ` 1q2mk.
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By using the pigeonhole principle on the number of resources f P Ezte´q u, there exists an
f P Ezte´q u such that:ÿ
iPN`
e
´
q
XN´
f
ppx2kqf ´ px
b
qqf q ` ppx2kqi,f´pxbqqi,f q ă ´p|N
`
e´q
XN´f | ` 1q2k.
Using the pigeonhole principle again on the number of players in N`
e´q
X N´f , there exists
an i P N`
e´q
XN´f such that
ppx2kqf ´ px
b
qqf q ` ppx2kqi,f ´ px
b
qqi,f q ď ´3k. (22)
We combine Equation (20), Equation (22) and the fact that x is an equilibrium for packet
size k to obtain:
µ`k
i,e´q
pxbqq ă
1
2
µ´2k
i,e´q
px2kq ď
1
2
µ`2ki,f px2kq ď µ
´k
i,f px
b
qq. (23)
Define e´q`1 “ argmaxePEtµ
´k
i,e px
b
qqu, then we have found a player i and a resource e
´
q`1 for
which B1 holds as i P N`
e´q
, B2 holds by definition of e´q`1 and B3 holds as equation (23)
implies µ`k
i,e´q
pxbqq ă µ
´k
i,f px
b
qq ď µ
´k
i,e´q`1
pxbqq.
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D Remaining Proof of Lemma 5.3
Remaining Proof of Lemma 5.3. In the second case we assume e`1 P argminePEtµ
`k
i,e px
b
1qu.
For resource e`1 we have:
B
1,`
i,minpx
b
1q ´B
1,´
i,e`
1
pxb1q
“ pµ`ki,minpx
b
1q ´ ai,e`
1
k2q ´ pµ´k
i,e`
1
pxb1q ´ ai,e`
1
k2q (by Definition (1))
“ µ`k
i,e`
1
pxb1q ´ µ
´k
i,e`
1
pxb1q pas e
`
1 P argmin
ePE
tµ`ki,e px
b
1quq
ą 0. pby Definition (11) and (12)q
For resource e´1 we have:
B
1,`
i,minpx
b
1q ´B
1,´
i,e´
1
pxb1q
“ pµ`k
i,e`
1
pxb1q ´ k
2ai,e`
1
q ´ pµ´k
i,e´
1
pxb1q ` k
2ai,e´
1
q (by Definition (1))
“ pµ`k
i,e`
1
pxq ` k2a
i,e`
1
q ´ pµ´k
i,e´
1
pxq ´ k2a
i,e´
1
q pas µ`k
i,e`
1
pxb1q “ µ
`k
i,e`
1
pxq ` 2k2a
i,e`
1
and µ´k
i,e´
1
pxb1q “ µ
´k
i,e´
1
pxq ´ 2k2a
i,e´
1
q
ą µ`ki,minpxq ´ µ
´k
i,e´
1
pxq. pby Definition of µ`ki,minpxqq
For resource e P Ezte`1 , e
´
1 u we have:
B
i,`
i,minpx
b
1q ´B
i,´
i,e px
b
1q
“ pµ`ki,minpx
b
1q ´ ai,e´
1
q ´ µ´ki,e px
b
1q (by Definition (1))
“ pµ`k
i,e`
1
pxq ` k2a
i,e`
1
q ´ µ´ki,e pxq pas µ
`k
i,e`
1
pxb1q “ µ
`k
i,e`
1
pxq ` 2k2a
i,e`
1
and µ´ki,e px
b
1q “ µ
´k
i,e pxqq
ą µ`ki,minpxq ´ µ
´k
i,e pxq. pby Definition of µ
`k
i,minpxqq
Thus, when e`1 “ argminePEtµ
`k
i,e px
b
1qu, we have:
B
1,`
i,minpx
b
1q ´B
1,´
i,e px
b
1q ą mintµ
`k
i,minpxq ´ µ
´k
i,e pxq, 0u.
Thus we have ∆ipxq ălex B
1
i px
b
1q and hence, ∆pxq ălex B
1pxb1q. For the third case we
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assume that e´1 “ argminePEtµ
`k
i,e py
1qu. For resource e`1 we have:
B
1,`
i,minpx
b
1q ´B
1,´
i,e`
1
pxb1q
“ pµ`ki,minpx
b
1q ` k
2a
i,e´
1
q ´ pµ´k
i,e`
1
pxb1q ´ k
2a
i,e`
1
q pby Definition 11 and 12q
ą µ`k
i,e´
1
pxb1q ´ µ
´k
i,e`
1
pxb1q pas e
´
1 “ argmin
ePE
tµ`ki,e px
b
1quq
“ µ´k
i,e´
1
pxq ´ µ`k
i,e`
1
pxq pas i moved a packet from e´1 to e
`
1 q
ą 0. pas µ´k
i,e´
1
pxq ą µ`k
i,e`
1
pxqq
For resource e´1 we have:
B
1,`
i,minpx
b
1q ´B
1,´
i,e´
1
pxb1q
“ pµ`ki,minpx
b
1q ` k
2a
i,e´
1
q ´ pµ´k
i,e´
1
pxb1q ` k
2a
i,e´
1
q pby Definition 11 and 12q
“ µ`k
i,e´
1
pxb1q ´ µ
´k
i,e´
1
pxb1q pas e
´
1 “ argmin
ePE
tµ`ki,e px
b
1quq
ą 0. pby Definition 1q
For resource e P Ezte`1 , e
´
1 u we have:
B
1,`
i,minpx
b
1q ´B
1,´
i,e px
b
1q
“ pµ`ki,minpx
b
1q ` k
2a
i,e´
1
q ´ µ´ki,e px
b
1q pby Definition 11 and 12q
ą µ`k
i,e´
1
pxb1q ´ µ
´k
i,e pxq pas e
´
1 “ argmin
ePE
tµ`ki,e px
b
1quq
“ µ´k
i,e´
1
pxq ´ µ´ki,e pxq pas player i moves a packet from e
´
1 to e
`
1 q
ą µ`k
i,e`
1
pxq ´ µ´ki,e pxq pas µ
´k
i,e´
1
pxq ą µ`k
i,e`
1
pxqq
ě µ`ki,minpxq ´ µ
´k
i,e pxq. pby definition of µ
`k
i,minpxqq
Thus, when e´1 “ argminePEtµ
`k
i,e px
b
1qu:
B
1,`
i,minpx
b
1q ´B
1,´
i,e px
b
1q ě mintµ
`k
i,minpxq ´ µ
´k
i,e pxq, 0u.
As µ`ki,minpxq´µ
´k
i,e´
1
pxq ă 0 ă B1,`i,minpx
b
1q´B
1,´
i,e´
1
pxb1q, we have ∆ipxq ălex B
1
i px
b
1q and hence,
∆pxq ălex B
1pxb1q.
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